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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS.
In the Matter of Gault, 35 U.S.L. Week 4399 (May 15, 1967).
After the decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), which revealed the Supreme
Court's solicitude of the constitutional rights of adults, it seemed
improbable that the lower courts would long be permitted to
continue ignoring the constitutional rights of juveniles. Thus
the decision in the principal case, which represents a break-
through in the assurance of a fair hearing to minors, comes as
no surprise. The case holds that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a juvenile has a right to notice of the charges against him,
to counsel, to confrontation of his accusers, to cross-examination,
and to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
The petitioners, the parents of Gerald Francis Gault, sought
the release of their son, who had been committed to the State
Industrial School of Arizona for allegedly making lewd telephone
calls. The petitioners contended that the proceedings under which
their son was committed violated his constitutional rights.'
Gerald was taken into custody on June 8, 1964 and was
held in the Gila County Detention Home until June 11. His
parents were not informed of his apprehension, and this infor-
mation was obtained only after they had sent Gerald's brother
to look for him. After learning what happened they went to
the Detention Home and were informed by a probation officer
that there would be a hearing the next day.
The hearing was held and Gerald, his mother, and two pro-
bation officers were present. The complainant did not appear.
A probation officer filed with the court a petition which merely
stated that Gerald was a delinquent minor and needed the pro-
tection of the Juvenile Court. The petition was not served on
the Gaults, nor did they see it until two months later. Gerald
was questioned about the telephone calls, but there is a dispute
as to what he stated, the only record being the testimony of
the juvenile judge, one of the probation officers, and of Mrs.
1 The State contended that Arizona's Juvenile Code is to be read as im-
pliedly implementing the due process concept and that the proceedings of
the Gault case did not offend these requirements. Application of Gault, 407
P. 2d 765.
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Gault. After this hearing Gerald was returned to the detention
home and subsequently released on June 11. On the day of his
release a note was given to his mother indicating the date of
the next hearing.3
At the next hearing, which took place four days later, the
complainant was again absent.4 After receiving a referral re-
port, the judge committed Gerald to the "State Industrial School
for the period of his minority (that is, until 21), unless sooner
discharged by due process of Law" (p. 4400).
In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court held that the
processes used by the Juvenile Court of Arizona violated the
constitutional rights of the individual to due process, confronta-
tion, cross-examination, to counsel, and to refuse self-incrimina-
tion.
The basic problem in the operation of the juvenile courts
lies not in their denial of the right to counsel or to confront one's
accusers or to engage in cross-examination, but in their failure
to remember the purpose of the juvenile court. There are at
least three promises of the juvenile court that remain unful-
filled:
"First, the promise that the consequences of a finding
of delinquency will, in fact, be noncriminal and that the
stigma of a criminal record will not obtain.
Second, the promise that the hearing itself will be
promptly held, easily understood, fair, and compatible with,
if not a part of, the treatment process ...
(Third), the promise that the child's treatment subse-
quent to a finding of delinquency will approximate as closely
as possible that which he should have received from his
natural parents." 5
As to the first promise, the founders of the juvenile court
envisioned a system that would protect an offender from being
unduly penalized for acts ascribable to the indiscretion of youth.
3 The entire text of the note is as follows:
"Mrs. Gault:
"Judge McGhee has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as
date and time for further hearings on Gerald's delinquency.
Is! Flagg"
The State claims that this was proper notice and that Mrs. Gault knew
what the charges were against Gerald.
4 Those present at the hearing were Gerald, his parents, Ronald Lewis
(who was with Gerald when the calls were made) and his father, Officers
Flagg and Henderson, and the judge.
5 Rosenheim, Justice and the Child, 27 (1962).
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Yet it is a well-known fact that in practice a youth's mistake
commonly follows him through life, for his records are fre-
quently made available to such organizations as the F. B. I., the
armed services, government agencies, and to private employers. 6
In most states police keep records of juvenile contacts and have
authority to disclose them. The police receive numerous re-
quests from the F. B. I., armed forces, and social agencies, and
usually comply)'
With reference to the second promise, juvenile court hear-
ings often amount to little more than a process of legal paper
filing. Those who have no knowledge of the law and are not
represented by counsel are easily confused by the process and
are consequently unable to take an active part in their defense.
It has been stated that, "Unless appropriate due process of law is
followed, even the juvenile who has violated the law may not
feel that he is being fairly treated and may therefore resist the
rehabilitative efforts of Court personnel." 8
The third promise, that the child's treatment subsequent to
a finding of delinquency should be comparable to that which his
natural parents would have provided, is seldom honored. Sub-
sequent to the delinquency finding the offender is usually placed
in a detention home for a specified period. This is pure and
simple punishment. However, it is punishment more of a delin-
quency status than punishment for specific conduct. If punish-
ment is the answer, then it should surely be confined to the
situation where there has been a formal determination that a
specific crime has been committed.
The Supreme Court has now ruled that an individual is not
beyond the protection of the Constitution's due process clause
merely because he is a minor. Those who administer the juvenile
courts must now implement this new standard. Those who find
the burden of this task difficult to accept would do well to re-
member that the most effective form of teaching is the setting of
a good example. Thus the youthful offender who receives fair
treatment is more likely to respond to rehabilitative efforts than
is the one who is treated arbitrarily. The achievement of a
higher rate of rehabilitation is surely worth the expenditure of
some additional effort.
ROBERT M. KUNCZT
6 In the Matter of Gault, 35 U.S.L. Week 4399, at 4405 (May 15, 1967).
7 Ibid.
s Id. at 4406.
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